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NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs claim defendants have breached a contract whereby
commissions are due for the sale of real property.

Defendants

counterclaimed for a portion of the commissions that had been paid
alleging that plaintiffs were not licensed as required by Utah
Statutes.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This matter was tried to the Court.

Plaintiffs were given

judgment on their Amended Complaint and defendants' Counterclaim
was dismissed.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek to have this Court exercise its supervisory
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equitiable jurisdiction; review the record; reverse the trial
court and enter judgment in favor of defendants on their
counterclaim, or, in the alternative, to reverse and remand to the
trial court for further appropriate proceedings.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff Global Recreation, Inc., a Utah corporation, GRI
subsequently known as Global Recreation, Inc., a Utah Corporation
dba Global Enterprises and Associates, and generally referred to
at the trial as "Global" was a marketing firm who entered into an
exclusive marketing agreement with Associated Industrial
Developers, commonly referred to as "AID".

The date of the

marketing agreement was September 28, 1976 (Exhibit 1).

Subsequent

to the time the agreement was entered into, AID, owner and
developer of property in Utah County, associated itself with a
partner, Near East Technological Services, Inc., a California
corporation, and commenced doing business under the name of Cedar
Hills Development Company, a partnership.

The defendant in this

matter is commonly referred to as Cedar Hills, however, this
results in some confusion because the property that the developer/
owner had agreed to market through the plaintiffs consisted of
several hundred acres in the north part of Utah County, which is
known as the Town of Cedar Hills.

Eldon P. Hendricks is named as

a plaintiff and was a properly licensed real estate broker who
associated himself with Global Enterprises on April 13, 1977 (See
answer to defendants' interrogatories, question No. 6).

Mr.

Hendricks was not in attendance at the trial and did not testify
in the matter.

Plaintiff Stan Snarr was added as a party to the

action after the original Complaint had been filed.

Mr. Snarr was
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never licensed as a real estate broker but only as a real estate
salesman.

His employment with Global commenced May 14, 1976

(Answer to defendants' interrogatories Nos. 2 and 6, R. 60, 61).
Purusant to the marketing agreement and in answer to defendants'
interrogatories, plaintiffs admitted that they had been paid total
commissions in the amount of $79,127.20.

Of this total amount,

the sum of $33,945 was paid from the period of November 24, 1976
through April 8, 1977.

This amount becomes significant because it

was during that period of time which the defendants alleged that
the plaintiffs did not have a licensed real estate broker
associated with them.

Prior to the time of trial, the parties,

through stipulation and settlement, agreed on the amount of the
commissions after the date of April 15, 1977 for which plaintiffs
were suing.

The issues then at trial, were whether or not

plaintiffs were entitled to commissions on the Wincor transaction
and whether defendants were entitled to relief sought in their
Counterclaim.
The Wincor transaction involved an earnest money agreement
entered into on November 19, 1976 (Exhibit 4) which ultimately
closed on a uniform real estate contract at a later date and upon
which plaintiffs were paid a partial commission.

However, because

of lack of improvements which had been a part of the transaction,
the uniform real estate contract was terminated and the property
was never conveyed by Cedar Hills Development, and no interest
in the property is claimed by Wincor (T. 71).
In plaintiffs' memorandum of law, dated November 15, 1978 and
filed November 17, 1978, it is admitted that plaintiff GRI had
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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failed to associate itself with a broker prior to April 15, 1977
(R.29).

However, at the time of trial, there was some confusion

in the evidence as to whether or not the plaintiffs were the
employees of AID which had a properly licensed broker by the name
of Jerald Richardson (Exhibit 2).

This confusion is compounded by

reason of the fact that Mr. Richardson was also the party
representing AID who signed as the owner of the property in the
listing agreement (Exhibit 1).

When sales were made by the

plaintiffs and commission checks were paid, they were drawn on the
Cedar Hills Development Company account and were made directly to
Global Recreation or Global Enterprises for the full amount of the
commission (See defendants' Exhibits 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10).

Mr.

Richardson testified that at the time he signed the marketing
agreement and the earnest money contracts and the commission
checks, that he did so as a property owner and not as a real
estate broker (T. 55, 57, 60, and Exhibit 2).

Plaintiff Stan

Snarr testified that he never received any payments directly from

AID but was paid a salary from Global (T. 28).
ARGUMENT I
TO RECOVER REAL ESTATE COMMISSIONS, THE PLAINTIFF MUST ALLEGE

AND PROVE COMPLIANCE WITH THE LICENSING STATUTES OF UTAH.
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, 61-2-1, provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person, co-partnership, or
corporation to engage in the business, act in the capacity
of, advertise or assume to act as a real estate broker or a
real estate salesman within this state without first
obtaining a license under the provisions of this chapter."
Sectior. 2 of that same chapter then proceeds to define real

-4-
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estate broker:
"The term real estate broker within the meaning of this
chapter shall include all persons, • • • corporations, who
for another and for a fee, commission or other valuable
consideration • • • sells • • • or lists . . • any real estate. 11
Plaintiffs, in making reference to the marketing agreement
designated as Exhibit 1, state:
"At the time said contract was signed, the plaintiff Global
Recreation, Inc., had as employees, several licensed real
estate agents, but had failed to associate itself with a
licensed broker." (See memorandum of law dated November 15,
1978 and filed November 17, 1978).
By its own terms, the marketing agreement between the parties
placed the responsibility for all necessary licensing upon Global
(Exhibit 1, page 2, "best efforts" clause); it was further agreed
in the "laws of Utah" clause, that the laws of the State
would govern the transaction (Exhibit 1, page 3).

of Utah

Therefore,

defendants claim, based on the contract for commissions due for
services rendered under the agreement, should be resolved through
reference to Utah Code Annotated, Section 61-2-1 through 22.
These sections of the Code were ignored by the trial court in its
decision.
Utah Code Annotated Section 61-2-18(a) denies standing to
anyone other than a real estate broker, duly licensed at the time
of the services resulting in the real estate sale to bring or
maintain an action in any court of the State.
The only issue on the plaintiffs' Amended Complaint at the
time of the trial was the Wincor transaction for which plaintiffs
claimed a balance of $10,700 was still due (the sum of $10,200 as
part of that Wincor commission had been paid to the plaintiffs on
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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November 24, 1976).

Defendants argue that at the time of the

Wincor transaction neither Mr. Snarr nor Global Recreation was a
licensed real estate broker and that plaintiff Eldon Hendricks had
not at that time become associated with Global and therefore, the
plaintiffs were precluded by statute from bringing this action.
Further, defendants contend that plaintiff Stan Snarr nev.er has
been a licensed real estate broker and has never claimed to be
licensed as a real estate broker and therefore, has no standing as
a plaintiff in this action.

Defendants argue that the plaintiffs

first violated the licensing requirements of the Utah Code at the
time they entered into the marketing agreement to market the real
property owned by Cedar Hills and further violations occurred with
concerted actions by Global salesmen leading to unlawfully
consurnated transactions including the Wincor sale.
Plaintiffs argued at the time of trial that since the owner/
representative of Cedar Hills, Mr. Jerald Richardson, was also a
licensed broker when he contracted with Global for their services,
they were in compliance with the licensing requirements and
entitled to bring suit for recovery of commissions.

However, by

his own trial testimony, (though admittedly confusing), Mr.
Richardson's answer contradicts this reasoning.

While being

examined and cross examined by both counsel, Mr. Richardson stated:
(1) the marketing agreement was signed in his capacity as principal
in the company of Associated Industrial Developers totally
independent of his incidental qualification as a licensed broker
(R. 55); (2) Mr. Richardson paid nothing to Global as a broker but
only as an owner/representative (T. 58 and 59); (3) the customary
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broker-salesmen commission split arrangement did not exist between
Richardson and Global, but such splitting was done between Global
and its salesmen (T.59); (4) Mr. Richardson authorized all checks
as a property owner or as a principal for AID (T. 60, 61, and 64);

(5) the Wincor earnest money agreement (Exhibit 4) was authorized
and signed by Richardson as owner/representative and not as a
licensed broker for Global (T. 66).
Utah Code Annotated, 61-2-10, restricts the procedure for
payment of commission to salesmen, making it unlawful for salesmen
to accept consideration for sales efforts from anyone other than
"his employer, who must be a licensed real estate broker".

Mr.

Richardson admits he made no payments to Global salesmen, though
they later allege him to be their licensed broker, nor did he sign
payments check as a broker, but rather as as owner/representative
of AID.

Nevertheless, it is a fact that the salesmen were

compensated by salary or commissions from their employer, Global
Recreation, Inc.

Not only does the testimony show that Mr.

Richardson did not act as a broker for Global, but also of every
greater significance, he was not named as one of the plaintiffs in
the action brought by Global.

If, in fact, Mr. Richardson was

the broker for Global, he would need to have been one of the
plaintiffs bringing the action as required by Utah Code Annotated,
61-2-18.
In Morris vs. John Price Associates, Inc., 590 P.2d 315,
(Utah 1979), this Court held that plaintiff Mr. Morris was an
improper party to an action to collect a real estate commission.
Mr. Morris was a licensed real estate salesman but not a licensed
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l

broker as defined and required under Utah Code.
In Diversified General Corp., vs. White Barn Golf Course,
~'

584 P.2d 849,

(Utah 1978), a case dealing with the inter-

pretation of Utah Code Annotated, 61-2-1 and 18, a corporate
plaintiff was denied recovery of commissions claimed pursuant to a
"finders agreement".

This Court affirmed the trial court's

summary judgment against the plaintiff based upon a violation of
the statute in performing real estate broker's services without
the required license.
In a recent contractor's licensing action, Meridian Corporation
vs. McGlynn/Garmaker Company, 567 P.2d 1110 (Utah 1977), the
plaintiff attempted to recover on a construction contract though
he was unlicensed in Utah as a contractor.

The Court cited

Olsen vs. Reece, 144 Utah 411, 200 P.2d 733 (1948) finding the
contractor in violation of a Utah regulatory statute, and
therefore, barred from recovery.

It reaffirmed the principle

recognized in Olsen whereby licensing provisions are placed into
two categories.

First, for the purpose of regulation and

protection of the public and second, for purpose of revenue. In
the first situation, contracts made by unlicensed persons are
void.

In the second situation, contracts made by unlicensed

persons are avoidable.

The Court, in Meridian, held that the

contract was void and stated that the statute had been passed for
the public's protection.

Real estate licensing statutes, too, are

intended to protect the public from irresponsible realtors (See
Andersen vs. Johnson, 160 P.2d 725 (Utah 1945).
Plaintiffs, in violation of these "regulatory laws" are
required to allege and prove their proper licensing in order to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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state a cause of action.

Smith vs. American Packing and

Provisions Company, 102 Utah 351, 130 P.2d 951.

The Smith court

refused to overturn the Olsen decision and reaffirmed these
"principles of law.

to be the laws of this state."

The same

principles are cited in a well driller case, which turned upon the
required license issue.
P.2d 149 (1969).

Mosely vs. Johnson, 22 Utah 2d 348, 453

This Court held that the statute requiring

drillers to secure a license was designed to protect the people of
the state.

Anyone drilling a well without this license could not

recover for services, either on the contract or on a theory of
quantum meruit.
In 27 Am Jur 2d, Section 117, Equity, it states:
"A court of equity has no more right than has a court of law
to act on its own notion of what is right in a particular
case; it must be guided by the established rules and
precedents • • • it is its duty to follow these principles
which have been established by precedent • • • a court of
equity is never required or justified in rendering an equitable
decision or decree or in aiding the accomplishment of that
which is a violation of law or public policy • • • where
rights are defined or established by existing legal
principles, they may not be changed or unsettled in equity.
A court of equity may not create rights not previously
existing at law • • • "
Defendants contend that the trial court in the present case
committed error in allowing recovery on equitable principles and
contrary to the precedent of the above referred to cases and the
above referred to statutes.

The Mosley rationale for denying

equitable recovery was stated as:
"that to allow one to evade the law and recover for work
which he is forbidden to pursue flys in the face of the
statutory intent." (453, P.2d 153)
When an agreement is negotiated by one required by statute to
maintain a license, the right to equitable recovery based on
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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performance depends upon the purpose of the licensing statute.
If legislative intent is to protect the public from fraud,
misrepresentation and dishonest and incompetent persons, all
agreements made by such unlicensed parties are held illegal, void
and unenforceable.

The wrongdoer is denied any recovery for

services rendered, either based on the contract or an equitable
theory of quantum meruit.

Conversely, when the legislature

intended the statute for revenue purposes, then substantial
performance could render the agreement enforceable through equity.
However, under the present fact situation before the Court, the
intent of the real estate statute as announced by this Court in
Anderson, supra,, is that the law is enacted for the regulation
and registration of those engaged in real estate broker
transactions and it is not created to raise revenue.
The trial court held that the defendants ratified an
otherwise void agreement through their continual performance of
agreement obligations.

The Second Restatement of Contract Law,

Section 13(a) declares that:
"A void agreement or promise is no contract at law and it is
void of legal effect. This is not to be confused with a
voidable agreement which acknowledges the validity of the
transaction but reserves to one or both parties the right to
avoid the obligations of the agreement. Voidable agreements,
unlike a void agreement, are subject to a ratification which
terminate the parties rights of avoidance. A party to
a voidable agreement, may by his words or acts, resurrect and
bind himself to his obligations under the agreement."
In 17 Am Jur 2d, Section 7, Contracts, it states:
"A void contract is no contract at all; it binds no one and
is a mere nullity • • • an action cannot be maintained for
damages for its breach."

-10-
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Defendants argue that the trial court erred in finding an
acquiescence through past payments under the marketing agreement.
It has been held that payment for services rendered under a void
agreement is insufficient to ratify the contract.

See Milford

vs. Milford Water Company, 124 Pa 610, 17A, 185.
ARGUMENT II
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO MAKE FINDINGS OF FACT WHICH WERE
ESSENTIAL TO PLAINTIFFS' RECOVERY.
The trial court failed to consider the unlawful actions of
Global.

It overlooked the legal principles which should have

rendered plaintiffs unable to bring this action.

Therefore, the

court erred in giving judgment to the plaintiff on unspecified
equitable grounds, without first resolving these facts as they
ii
11

relate to the law.

A trial court's power to decide a case in law

or in equity is not argued, but a court may not disregard clearly
applicable legal precedents in deciding intuitively what is right
in a particular action.

The trial court said:

"· •• the court • • • does not deem it necessary to decide
the case upon legal principles of law but will do so on
equitable principles." (See Memorandum Decision R. 90)
A court may not waive its imaginative equitable wand and
cause the disappearance of precedent and statutory regulations
which both the Utah Legislature and the Utah Supreme Court have
endeavored to preserve as a protection to the public.

Questions

are not to be decided on the basis of "raw equity" when such
relief blatantly defies legal principles and precedents in
conflict thereof.

See Empire Engineering Corporation vs. Mack,

I

217 NY 85, 11 NE 475.
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In its memorandum decision, the trial court acknowledged
confusion as to the relationship of the parties.

It was the

court's responsibility to sort out the confusion and clarify the
status of the parties as defined by law.
carried out.

This duty was not

The existence of a legally recognized relationship

is germaine to any decision based on the real estate licening
statutes.

The plaintiff's burden has been clearly defined as

"alleging and proving it was duly licensed as a real estate broker
at the time the cause of action arose."
been decided.

This issue has not yet

Only a licensed broker is recognized by statute as

having sufficient personal standing to bring such an action.
Part of the dispute at the time of trial was whether the
Wincor transaction had ever been completed and closed (See Exhibit
2).

Evidence was introduced to show that the obligation of the

vendor in completing the improvements that were part of the
transaction were never made. Wincor never possessed the property
and received the return of all funds they had paid and the
property continues to the present in the ownership of Cedar Hills.
On the other hand, plaintiffs contend that the transaction was
closed by reason of the fact that a uniform real estate contract
was entered into and a partial commission paid on November 24,
1976.

In its memorandum decision, the court states that the

plaintiffs are entitled to judgment in the amount of $6,780 "if in
fact the sale upon which the commission is claimed is completed
and the transaction closed."

The court circumvented its respon-

sibility in making a finding of fact on this disputed matter.
remains to the present time, the contention of the defendants,
that the transaction was never fully completed and therefore,
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It

there would be no liability for the commission as ordered by the
court.

ARGUMENT III
DEFENDANTS' COUNTERCLAIM FOR A SUM OF ONE TO THREE TIMES THE
AMOUNT OF COMMISSION PAID AT THE TIME THE PLAINTIFFS WERE
UNLICENSED SHOULD BE GRANTED.
Utah Code Annotated, 61-2-17(b) reads:
"In case any person • • • or corporation shall have received
any sum of money • • • as commission • • • by or in consequence
of his violation of any provision of this act, such person .
• • or corporation shall also be liable to a penalty of not
less than the amount of the sum of money so received and not
more than three times the sum so received, as may be
determined by the court, which penalty may be sued for and
recovered by any person agrieved and for his use and benefit,
in any court of competent jurisdiction."
The sum of $33,945 was paid by the defendants to the
plaintiffs at a time when there was no licensed broker associated
with the plaintiffs (See defendants' exhibits 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10;
also answers to defendants' interrogatories).

To allow plaintiffs

to avoid any such penalty would be circumventing the intent of the
Legislature.

SUMMARY
Plaintiffs have, in numerous instances, violated Utah law
regulating real estate licensing.

The plaintiffs are not entitled

to collect the commission on the Wincor transaction because of
such violation and further because of the fact that the
transaction was never closed.

The sum of $101,835, three times

$33,945, which was paid by the defendants during a time when the
plaintiffs were not licensed, should be

'/ffiposed in the form of a

penalty against the plaintiffs.
-13-
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DATED this 8th day of January, 1980.

WILSON
for Defendant/Appellants
350 East Center
Provo, Utah 84601
375-9801

MAILING CERTIFICATE
/£~/!

I hereby certify that I ~ a copy of the foregoing to H.
Grant Ivins, Attorney for Plaintiffs/Respondents, 75 North Center,
American Fork, Utah, 84003, postage prepaid this _:;____ day of
January, 1980.
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